VI C

 

HOME     CONTENTS: Journals & Papers of Søren Kierkegaard

I   -   II  -   III  -   IV  -   V  -   VI  -   VII  -   VIII  -   IX  -   X  -   XI    

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VI A   -   VI B   -   VI C

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1

The distinction between . The confusion in Hegelian philosophy; a fitting observation on this by R. Nielsen in his Propedeutiske Logik.

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2

Aristotle's Rhetoric

The enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism.

Ch. II

Rhetoric is the capacity, the rhetorical ability, to consider in everything that which is suitable for awakening belief (πιθανóν).

Every other [art] will either instruct or awaken conviction (διδασκαλικη—πιστικη).

πíστις, in the plural, the means whereby conviction is awakened (consequently active).

Three kinds of πíστεις in speaking: (1) that which is constituted by the character of the speaker (

), (2) that which puts the hearer in a particular mood, (3) that which lies in the speech itself in that it proves or seems to prove.

Rhetoric becomes an off-shoot of dialectic and of that part of morals which can be called politics.

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3

 

Rhetoric, ch. III

There are three kinds of hearers, therefore [three kinds of] speakers:

1. to θεωρòς (the knowledgeable), the artful speech (επιδεικτικòς)
   the present
   praise and censure
         the praiseworthy — the vicious
2. to deliberative assemblies (ο εκκλησιαστης)
   the future
   persuading — dissuading
   benefit — harm
3. to the judge
   the past
   accusation — defense
   justice — injustice

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4

1. The character of the speaker (

   

   ).
2. The listeners are brought into a certain state.
3. The speech proves or seems to prove.

1. in deliberative conclusions.
2. before courts.
3. eulogies.

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5

Addition to previous:

In his Rhetoric
Aristotle does not consider
the "listener" at all.—

Only in Book I, ch. 3,
at the very beginning, is
there a little bit.

See Book III, ch. 1
marked in my copy of
the translation.

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